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ESSAY
IS “DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION” DISTINCT FROM A POLITICAL
EQUALITY ARGUMENT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS?
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR LESSIG
RICHARD L. HASEN*
I.
INTRODUCTION
I greatly appreciate Professor Lawrence Lessig’s interest in and passion
about limiting the corrosive role of money in American politics. Lessig is an
academic rock star, a great online and social media presence who draws large
crowds for his multimedia presentations wherever he goes to talk about reforming
our campaign finance system. He has done more to educate the general public
about these issues than anyone else (aside from possibly Stephen Colbert),
certainly more than those of us, like me, who have spent our entire careers writing
about campaign finance issues.
And yet I have unease about a central premise of Lessig’s argument: that
“dependence corruption,” the government interest he advances to support the
constitutionality of his proposed campaign finance reforms, is analytically distinct
from an interest in promoting political equality. Lessig’s argument is crucial to the
constitutionality of his program before the current Supreme Court, which has
rejected political equality as a permissible interest to support campaign finance
regulation. I recently discussed my concerns about the dependence corruption
argument in a Harvard Law Review book review1 of Lessig’s new book, Republic,
Lost, and Lessig has responded with a defense in a Harvard Law Review Forum
Reply2 and in his public presentations.3
*

Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Bruce
Cain, Sarah Lawsky, Dan Lowenstein, David Strauss, and Zephyr Teachout for useful comments
and suggestions.
1
Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550 (2012) (reviewing LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011) and JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT (2011)).
2
Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61 (2012).
3
A video of Lessig’s January 25, 2013 presentation at the University of Texas, Austin’s
conference, “Is America Governable?,” is posted on YouTube at: http://youtu.be/dbdqFdw9NH8
[hereafter Lessig Video]. After I posted a draft of this article on SSRN, Lessig wrote a further
Reply, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean], CAL. L. REV.
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My continuing concern is not primarily with Lessig’s prediction that a
current majority of the Supreme Court could well accept the dependence
corruption rationale to justify new restrictions, such as contribution limits to super
PACs—although I do think he is wrong in that prediction and that in his role as
campaign finance reform zealot, he gives false hope to those who think the Court
would soon effectively overturn Citizens United v. FEC4 using his analysis.
Rather, Lessig’s dependence corruption argument encourages fuzzy thinking
about the political equality rationale at a time when we need clear thinking about,
and defenses of, political equality arguments. There could well be a time within
the next decade when a more liberal Supreme Court majority may consider
overturning recent precedent and allowing more regulation. By being more precise
about what is at stake with such regulation, and the potential costs to free
expression, supporters of reasonable campaign finance regulation will be better
positioned to defend a new set of laws. In the end, the debate over dependence
corruption helps elucidate the best and worst types of political equality arguments
to advance to a future Supreme Court and American public.

II.
DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION AS DISTINCT FROM POLITICAL EQUALITY:
THE DEBATE THUS FAR
Campaign finance laws are complex, and the United States Supreme
Court’s pronouncements on the constitutionality of various campaign finance laws
and regulation add layers of complexity which torment students and professors of
election law alike. At the risk of caricature, here is the basic current state of
constitutional doctrine as it pertains to campaign finance.5
Limits on the amount of money which individuals or entities spend in
candidate elections6 or contribute to candidates, parties, or groups raise First
Amendment concerns because they impose a burden on free speech and
association. The Court has recognized only the interest in preventing corruption

(forthcoming
2013),
draft
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257948 [hereinafter, Lessig, Originalist].
4
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5
For a detailed exploration of these issues, see DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, &
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 12-16 (5th ed. 2012).
6
The analysis differs somewhat for ballot measure elections, but I ignore these issues because they
are irrelevant to this Essay.
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and the appearance of corruption to justify limits on the use of money in
elections.7
While the anticorruption interest may be somewhat broader than
preventing quids pro quo and other bribery-like conduct, it is not much broader.
The Supreme Court’s views of what counts as “corruption” has ebbed and flowed
over time,8 and once included the concern that elected officials might be “too
compliant” with the wishes of contributors.9 But no longer. Under current
Supreme Court doctrine, corruption does not extend even to the sale of access to
elected officials and candidates in exchange for campaign contributions or
fundraising activities; as the Court recently explained in the controversial Citizens
United case, ingratiation and access are not corruption.10
The Court has justified contribution limitations to candidates on
anticorruption grounds: limiting contributions helps insure that elected officials do
not take official action in exchange for large contributions.11 But the Court in
Citizens United has rejected an anticorruption interest to justify limits on truly
independent spending, reasoning that independent spending done without a
candidate’s cooperation or consultation can neither corrupt nor create the
appearance of corruption.12
Relying on this reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in a case called SpeechNow struck down a limit on
contributions to committees which spend independently of candidates.13 The court
reasoned that if independent spending can never corrupt or create the appearance
of corruption, contributions to fund such spending cannot be justified on

7

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Additional interests may justify disclosure laws, such
as providing relevant information to voters. See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra note 5, ch
16. But that issue is also irrelevant to this Essay.
8
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581
(2011); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, The Newer
Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After
Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004).
9
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
10
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-360.
11
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-28.
12
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
13
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied Keating v. FEC, 131 S.Ct.
553 (2010).

4

RICHARD L. HASEN

anticorruption grounds either.14 This is the ruling which led to the emergence of
Super-PACs and similar organizations.15
Promoting political equality—at least in the form of leveling the playing
field—has not fared well at the Supreme Court as an interest justifying campaign
finance limits. The Court in the key 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo rejected an
equalization rationale as “wholly foreign” to the First Amendment.16 In Citizens
United the Court reaffirmed this point. It overturned a 1990 Supreme Court case,17
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,18 which upheld a requirement that
corporations use a political action committee rather than the corporation’s general
treasury funds to spend to support or oppose candidates for office in the state of
Michigan. The Court majority in Austin had justified the state’s interest in barring
the use of corporate treasury funds in candidate elections by what it called the
prevention of a “different type of corruption:” “the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”19
I have long characterized this Austin interest as one not about corruption
prevention but about promoting political equality by preventing corporate
spending from distorting electoral or legislative outcomes.20 In his concurring
opinion in Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts cited my work and others’ work
reading Austin in this way, concluding that the Austin antidistortion interest was
an equality interest.21 The Chief Justice (and the Court) rejected it on that basis.
The Court reaffirmed its rejection of an equality interest in a recent case, Arizona
Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett,22 involving Arizona’s public financing system,
which gave participating candidates extra public funds when facing large spending
from opposing candidates or third-party groups.
Lessig wants to reduce the role of money in politics through a set of
legislative reforms which he claims would survive a constitutional challenge. In
Republic, Lost and in his public lectures about reform, Lessig has made it clear
14

Id. at 694-95.
Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_u
nited_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spending_.html.
16
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
17
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
18
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
19
Id. at 660.
20
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 113 (2003).
21
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 381 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
22
131 S.Ct. 2806, 2825 (2011).
15
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that he favors not only public financing of congressional campaigns via vouchers
to empower voters. but also limits on contributions to independent groups
involved in candidate elections.23 In other words, he wants to shut down the Super
PAC option opened by Citizens United and SpeechNow. How can such limitations
be constitutionally justified under the Supreme Court’s current campaign finance
jurisprudence?
In Republic, Lost, Lessig justified his proposals with reference to what he
terms “dependence corruption,” a type of corruption which he says is analytically
distinct from the bribery-like corruption (which Lessig terms “Type 1” corruption)
accepted by the Supreme Court to justify contribution limits to candidates.24 “In
this second sense of corruption, it is not individuals who are corrupted within a
well-functioning institution. It is instead an institution that has been corrupted,
because patterns of influence operating upon individuals within that institution
draws them away from the influence intended.”25
As I explained in my earlier Review, Lessig tellingly uses passive voice to
describe this type of “corruption:”
the “institution” of government “has been corrupted”—by whom he does
not say. It is a “corruption” not in that lobbyists or others give legislators
gifts in exchange for official action, but one in which the system
“distort[s]” outcomes.26
Lessig explains that the “real risk” to the political system arises thanks to
contributions funneled through lobbyists: “Influence happens on the margin, and
the most powerful are the contributors who stand there.”27 Even if lobbyist-driven
contributions were small relative to other contributions, “if it provided a reliable
and substantial source of funds, then its potential to distort policy would be
huge.”28
I concluded in my initial review that Lessig’s concern about distortion of
policy outcomes caused by the spending of money sounded a whole lot like
Austin’s political-equality-masquerading-as-corruption rationale, which the
Supreme Court rejected in Citizens United.29 Lessig expressed concern that those
23

Lessig Video, supra note 3.
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 17-20.
25
Id. at 231.
26
Hasen, supra note 1, at 571 (footnotes omitted).
27
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 121.
28
Id.
29
Hasen, supra note 1, at 572. I also suggested that part of his rationale sounded like an efficiency
rationale; in this view campaign finance facilitates rent-seeking and can cause an economic
24
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with money and superior fundraising abilities can use these tools to have greater
influence than everyone else over political outcomes. This looks like a concern
about the wealthy using their wealth to skew political outcomes, a type of political
equality argument.
In his reply to my review, Lessig devotes three-quarters of his space (9 of
12 pages) to refute my claim that dependence corruption is a type of political
equality argument.30
Lessig begins by making a point with which I agree: a campaign finance
law justified on traditional anticorruption grounds should not become
unconstitutional if the law incidentally promotes political equality.31 For example,
a law limiting individuals to $1,000 candidate contributions in an election is
justified on anticorruption grounds, but it also may level the playing field by
limiting the most direct form of influence over politicians.
In support of this non-controversial point, Lessig begins with the premise
that “if ‘money is speech,’ then certainly ‘votes are speech’ too. Yet when the
Court invalidated hundreds of years of election law governing the drawing of
legislative districts, it was for the explicit purpose of equalizing that speech —
a.k.a. the vote.”32 The analogy is quite odd. To begin with, the Supreme Court
has rejected the idea that voting has expressive value protected by the First
Amendment,33 although it recently seemed to back off from a strict statement of
this point.34 More importantly, the voting analogy is off the mark: in challenges to
decline. Id. at 572-73. Lessig does not address this point in his response and I do not write further
about it here.
30
Lessig, supra note 2. In the remaining third of his Reply, he makes two points. First, while he
concedes that the existing evidence shows that public trust does not seem to rise with the
enactment of campaign finance reform plans thus far, “that doesn’t mean that a more trustworthy
system wouldn’t increase the public’s trust.” Id. at 72. Second, while conceding he does not “have
the data to support any causal link” between money spent on politics and a rise in political
polarization,” id. at 73, he argues that a voucher system could strengthen moderates at the
expenses of extremists in politics. “Could, not necessarily would.” Id. at 74.
31
Id. at 62. While I agree with the normative point, it is not clear that this is how the current Court
sees things: the Supreme Court in Bennett seemed to reject the Arizona public financing plan
because the people may have been motivated to level the playing field in passing it. Lessig
similarly argues that the Supreme Court did not mean to “demonize ‘equality’ in general, or banish
as a compelling interest any interest that might also happen to correlate, in part at least, with
equality.” Id. at 63.
32
Id. at 62.
33
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (“Attributing to elections a more generalized
expressive function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and
efficiently”); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (“Ballots serve
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression”); Adam Winkler, Note,
Expressive Voting, 68 NYU L. REV. 330 (1993).
34
Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818 n.1 (2010).
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malapportioned districts, the Court has accepted political equality as a compelling
interest to require the creation of equally weighted voting districts.35 Political
equality is not a side effect of the Court’s one person, one vote jurisprudence but
rather its defining feature. In contrast, political equality issues arise in campaign
finance cases as a possible justification for potential infringement of First
Amendment speech and association rights.
In any case, Lessig’s point about incidental legislative motive to equalize
voting power and his analogy to “voting as speech” is tangential to his main goal
of refining and defending his notion of dependence corruption. He begins his main
argument by defining “dependence corruption” (even providing us with a
pronunciation guide: “de·pen·dence cor·rup·tion \di-'pen-dəns kə-'rəp-shən\
noun”) as “the state of an institution or an individual that has developed a
dependence different from a, or the, dependence intended or desired.”36 Distortion
of policy is an effect of dependence corruption and not the “pathology” itself.37
Once again, passive voice dominates the definition: an institution is in a state of
corruption when there is a gap between developed dependence and dependence
desired—but the definition does not tell us who must desire a particular type of
dependence.
35

See, e.g. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964):
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of
government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by
and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and
unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid that a
constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that certain otherwise qualified
voters had been entirely prohibited from voting for members of their state legislature.
And, if a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be
given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part
of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would appear extraordinary to suggest
that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the
State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while
voters living elsewhere could vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to
the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the
State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in another area
would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable.

36

Lessig, supra note 2, at 65.
“But I am not ‘writing more about a distortion,’ even if ‘a distortion’ is the consequence of what
I am writing about — just as a book about alcoholism is not ‘writing about liver failure,’ even if
liver failure is an effect of alcoholism. Hasen has confused a consequence with the pathology.” Id.
at 64.
37
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Lessig explains that in the context of campaign finance regulation, the
dependence “intended or desired” of elected officials is a dependence “on the
people alone”—a phrase he draws from The Federalist No. 52.38 However, in our
current political system elected officials are dependent not just upon the people
but also upon “the funders”—those who provide the bulk of the money for
campaigns. In his multimedia talks, he calls the funders “the Lesters” who live in
“Lesterland” and who get to vote in a Lester-only primary to winnow the set of
candidates to be chosen in general elections conducted among all “the people.”39
The Lesters (or funders) constitute the very small fraction of people in the
country who contribute or spend money on elections. Candidates need funders’
money in this invisible wealth primary and “[t]hat need is a dependence.”40 The
wealth primary, which narrows the field of candidates who run in the general
election, makes elected officials dependent on the funders and not “upon the
people alone.”
Lessig then explains why he believes dependence corruption is “distinct
from the aim to ‘level the playing field’ (the more precise statement of the
‘equality’ sin identified by the Court in Bennett).”41 He says that one can remedy
dependence corruption without leveling the playing field. For example, he says
that his proposed voucher program (which is similar to a voucher program I
proposed in 199642) would not “level the playing field” because the result would
not be equality of campaign funding for all candidates.43
Further, he states that not all attempts to level the playing field deal with
the dependence corruption problem. A law that bans union get-out-the-vote efforts
might level the playing field when it comes to organizational benefits, but such a
law would not be justified by an interest in insuring that “the people alone”
choose representatives.44 He concludes that “‘[d]ependence corruption’ is thus
not the inequality corruption in Austin. Neither is it the more general corruption
that runs under the moniker ‘political equality.’”45 Instead, “‘dependence
corruption’ is a distinct concept of corruption that points to the relationship
between a dependence intended and the dependence realized. . . . [I]t is missing

38

Id. at 65. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (describing context for phrase in Federalist
No. 52).
39
Lessig Video, supra note 3.
40
Lessig, supra note 2, at 65.
41
Id. at 66.
42
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996).
43
Lessig, supra, note 2, at 66.
44
Id. at 67.
45
Id.
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the point to reject the conception by arguing that it is really “‘distortion of policy
outcomes, or skew.’”46
Dependence corruption is a problem, Lessig explains, because “a
reasonable citizen could believe that the candidates have become distracted” by
the large search for money.47
The dynamic of representative government —in which representatives are
responsive to all citizens — has been undermined by a system that makes
representatives responsive to funders first, and only then to citizens. That
is a plain corruption of the system of influence the Framers intended. It
should be a plainly constitutional target for congressional reform.48
Lessig concludes by explaining how the Supreme Court could consider
dependence corruption as a compelling interest to justify additional campaign
finance regulation. Such recognition would not require the Court to overrule
Citizens United, which considered only whether the usual anticorruption and
antidistortion arguments justified a ban on direct spending of corporate general
treasury funds. Indeed, given that the facts of Citizens United sought to stop a
nonprofit filmmaker from spending its corporate funds to promote its own film
(apparently not violating the idea that “the people alone” choose elected officials),
Lessig believes the Court reached the right result.49 But he claims that preventing
dependence corruption could justify reversing SpeechNow to restore the $5,000
individual contribution limits to political action committees, thereby ending super
PACs. “If the last three years [since Citizens United] have demonstrated anything,
it is that the removal on limits on contributions to political action committees,
whether independent or not, only increases the gap between ‘the people’ and ‘the
funders.’”50
Lessig contends that while independent spending in candidate elections
would not necessarily meet the definition of dependence corruption if such

46

Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
48
Id.
49
Id. Lessig does not acknowledge that under the law as it existed before Citizens United, a
nonprofit ideological corporation which took no for-profit corporate or labor union money already
was constitutionally exempt from corporate spending limits in candidate elections. FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Citizens United could not take advantage of this exemption
because it deliberately took some for-profit corporate money to create a test case. See Hasen,
Illusion of Coherence, supra note 8, at 591 n.59. It was a camel’s nose in the tent to get the forprofit corporate spending limit eliminated.
50
Lessig, supra note 2, at 69.
47
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spending were “sporadic,”51 the regular mega-contributions to Super-PACs in the
2012 elections show that elected officials “understand themselves to be
dependent” upon large contributors to independent political committees. He does
not say whether a Congress similarly concerned about dependence corruption
from independent spending (if the Super-PAC option ended) could bar Sheldon
Adelson from directly spending vast sums of his money on advertising, if the
government could show that elected officials understand themselves to be
dependent upon large independent spenders. Nor does he say how his program
could be effective without this additional limitation. That is, Lessig’s logic leaves
open the possibility of reversing Buckley’s ban on independent expenditure limits
applied to individuals.
Lessig concludes by predicting that the Supreme Court could well accept
his dependence corruption argument to justify limits on contributions to
independent expenditure committees. He says that at least one Justice committed
to originalism in the Supreme Court majority (but not Justice Scalia) could switch
positions from Citizens United and vote with the more liberal Supreme Court
Justices to uphold additional campaign finance regulations.52

III.
LESTERS ARE PEOPLE, MY FRIEND:53 DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION AS A
TYPE OF POLITICAL EQUALITY ARGUMENT
Lessig’s dependence corruption rationale depends entirely upon a
distinction between “the people alone” and “the funders” (or the “Lesters”). The
“system” is “corrupted” when elected officials are dependent not on “the people
alone” but also on “the funders”/“Lesters.”
But who are the funders? In Lessig’s multimedia presentation, “the
Lesters” look vaguely like the “Smithers” character from The Simpsons.54
Smithers is the flunky for the richest man in town, nuclear power plant owner Mr.
Burns—and Smithers is secretly in love with Mr. Burns and his great wealth
Whatever is true in Lesterland, here on Planet Earth “the funders” are certainly
51

Id.
See id. at 70-71.
53
With apologies to Mitt Romney. See Philip Rucker, Romney Says ‘Corporations are People’ at
Iowa State Fair, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0811/politics/35270239_1_romney-supporters-mitt-romney-private-sector-experience
(“‘Corporations are people, my friend,’ Romney said”).
54
Lessig video, supra note 3, at 7:05. Lessig explains that his real first name is not Lawrence but
Lester, justifying his picking on the Lesters. Id.
52
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part of “the people.” The people funding campaigns are (generally more wealthy)
American citizens, permanent residents, and (as of Citizens United) now
American corporations, labor unions, and other entities who spend money on
candidate campaigns and give to Super-PACs and 501c’s.55
To put Lessig’s argument another way, Lessig objects that a (generally
wealthier) subset of “the people” in the United States have greater influence over
the outcome of federal elections or over federal public policy than another, much
larger subset of “the people” do. This greater influence over elections or policy is
the source of the distortion or skew, explaining why political outcomes sometimes
do not match majoritarian preferences. Lessig further objects that “the people,”
upon learning of the oversized influence of (wealthy) funders over elected
officials will lose trust in a political system.
Putting aside the trust point for now, Lessig’s argument is fairly
characterized as a political equality argument. A political equality argument is one
which seeks to justify a law on grounds that it distributes political power fairly or
seeks to attack a law in court on grounds that it distributes political power in an
unequal way. The problem with malapportioned legislative districts, as struck
down in the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote cases, is that such districts
treated people unequally by giving some people much more voting power than
others.
Lessig’s dependence corruption argument is a political equality argument
because it seeks to justify campaign finance laws on grounds that the laws
distribute political power fairly and correct a distortion present in an unregulated
(or less regulated) system. His concern is that some people in society have greater
influence over election results and legislative results in Congress than others
based solely upon their wealth and fundraising abilities. The gap between what
“the people” want and what “the funders” want is the source of the inequality. The
wealthy in this way are similar to pre-Baker v. Carr voters in sparsely-populated
districts who had more voting power than voters in big cities.56

55

“The people” do not include foreign individuals and entities (aside from permanent residents),
and existing law (recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court) bars foreigners from giving or
spending money in our elections. Bluman v. FEC, 132 S.Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.), affirming 800 F.
Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court); LOWENSTEIN, HASEN, & TOKAJI, supra, note 3, at
756-57. “The funders” include voters and other “people” who are U.S. citizens and permanent
residents. Lessig does not object to corporate involvement in elections per se. In his video
presentation he rejects calls to reverse Citizens United and simply bar corporate spending in
elections, arguing it would not stop the problem of dependence corruption.
56
The analogy is not precisely the same. In Lessig’s example, the funders exert their greater
influence through the invisible wealth primary, while in malapportioned districts the voters in
smaller districts exert greater power over legislators in a legislative body.
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Here is how we know Lessig’s argument is one about equality rather than
corruption. Under Lessig’s voucher plan, where voters have equal capital to spend
on elections, elected officials are dependent upon a subset of the people as well—
those who use vouchers to support the candidate, or her party, or interest groups
backing the candidate. As under the current system, elected officials depend upon
a subset of the people for support, and presumably are more responsive to the
needs of these funders than to all of the people. Yet this skewed responsiveness is
not a form of “dependence corruption:” indeed Lessig proposes vouchers to end
dependence corruption. What is objectionable about the current system, then, is
not that elected officials are beholden and responsive to a subset of voters but that
they are beholden to a subset of wealthy and well organized voters whose interests
do not align with the interests of voters overall.
Lessig is right that his argument differs in some particulars from the
equality argument in Austin, But even Lessig recognizes that there are different
types of equality arguments,57 and therefore his ability to distinguish dependence
corruption from Austin antidistortion does not disprove the point that dependence
corruption is also an equality argument.
Austin advances what I’ve termed a “barometer equality” argument58—the
idea that that the amount spent on elections should roughly correlate with public’s
support for the candidates funded, at least when it comes to the question of
corporate funding. Lessig does not argue precisely for Austin equality—his
argument is not one primarily about corporations, for example—but he also
rejects outsized influence by wealthy contributors and spenders. Like Austin’s
antidistortion, Lessig’s dependence corruption interest argues for a system in
which spending on elections is somehow tied to public support for candidates.
Vouchers insure that candidates are funded in a way reflecting popular interest—a
rough barometer of popular support. Indeed, that is why I support them.

57

He calls the equality “sin” in Bennett one about “leveling the playing field.” Lessig, supra note
2, at 66. In his most recent response in this dialogue, Lessig continues to insist that dependence
corruption is not an equality argument. In making his argument that it is corruption, not inequality,
when the “Lesters” get to participate in the wealth primary, he analogizes primaries conducted in
which the voters are all white, or where the sole primary voter is the Queen of England, or where
the state Senators get to choose who could run to be members of Congress. Lessig, Originalism,
supra note 3 at 19-22. Without rehashing all the arguments in the text above, all of Lessig’s
examples are objectionable (for among other reasons) because of inequality, not because of
corruption. Indeed, I always thought that was the point of the White Primary cases.
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HASEN, supra note 20, at 113.
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To put the point more generally, political equality arguments come in three
varieties: political input, political output, and political opportunity.59 Some
political equality arguments support political systems in which each voter has
roughly equal political power to influence who is elected to office. The one
person, one vote rule and campaign finance voucher plans may each seek to insure
equality of political inputs. In a voucher system like Lessig’s, each voter’s
political power is roughly the same but each candidate’s political power will vary
depending upon the amount of public voucher support.
Others argue for political systems equalizing political outputs: a public
financing system giving each candidate (rather than each voter) roughly equal
political funding seeks to equalize political outputs. Major party candidates in
presidential elections can opt into a public funding plan modeled along these
lines. Both an input and an output campaign finance plan might “level the playing
field” depending upon how we define the “field:” input arguments level the field
among voters while output arguments level the field among candidates.
Political systems also might promote equality by insuring equality of
political opportunity—providing a floor of public financing for all candidates or
parties, for example. The presidential public financing system provides matching
funds for the first $250 which presidential candidates raise in political primaries.
It also allows minor parties who demonstrate some public support to get some
public financing, although less than major party candidates. Heather Gerken’s60
and Dorie Appollonio, Bruce Cain and Lee Drutman’s61 separate proposals to
subsidize public interest lobbying (without capping the lobbying activities of
others) seek to insure equality of political opportunity. Lessig’s earlier calls for his
voucher plan fit into this category, because he was not interested in limiting
outside spending. But with the rise of super PACs, he has now made a limit on
contributions to independent groups a central part of his reform agenda and seems
open to independent spending limits as well.62
59

These categories have some overlap with but are not the same as categories Bruce Cain develops
in Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
111, 131-139 (discussing participation equity, influence equity, and outcome equity).
60
Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1155, 1165-67 (2011).
61
Dorie Apollonio et al, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 48 (2008).
62
LAWRENCE LESSIG, ONE WAY FORWARD: THE OUTSIDER’S GUIDE TO FIXING THE REPUBLIC
(Kindle Single) (Kindle Location 708-09) (2012).
I used to believe that this change [to vouchers] would be enough. But the dynamic that
we’ve seen over the past two years with super PACs has convinced me that we need
something more. The government, in my view, should never have the power to ban the
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Thus, when Lessig says his dependence corruption argument is not an
equality argument, or not a “level the playing field argument,” because it does not
fund all candidates equally, he is being unduly narrow in his definition of a
political equality argument. Lessig’s exhortation to restore contribution limits on
independent political committees in the name of preventing dependence
corruption is no less than a call to insure that the wealthy do not have
disproportionate influence over electoral or legislative outcomes. It is a call for
equality of political inputs. He seeks to reduce the voice of some to enhance the
relative voice of others, something the Court in Buckley called an “equalization”
rationale (and which the Court rejected as an impermissible basis for spending
limits63).
There is one other way to think about Lessig’s argument, though it is one
he resists in his book and his talks: that he really is talking not about a “different”
kind or corruption or political equality, but rather about normal “Type 1”
corruption, akin to bribery. This point echoes and is informed by an important
1995 debate among Bruce Cain, Dan Lowenstein and David Strauss on the
intersection of corruption and political equality in the context of an imaginary
plan to equalize campaign funding with vouchers.64
To begin with, everyone agrees that if an elected official took $50,000
from an individual and used it to buy a car in exchange for voting a certain way in
the legislative body, this exchange would be considered corrupt and the
government could bar the practice. Taking official action for private benefit is
corrupt.
But what if an elected official voted a certain way in a legislative body in
exchange for a $50,000 campaign contribution—that is, exchanging a political,
not a personal benefit for dollars? Is that corrupt? In the Lowenstein debate with

political speech of any individual or group, regardless of whether a citizen or not, or “a
person” or not. Citizens, foreigners, corporations, and (someday, I hope) dolphins should
be free to add their perspective to the political marketplace of ideas. But the recent
experience with super PACs has convinced me that there must be an ability to limit the
amount of independent expenditures that can be made in a campaign, so as to assure that
candidates don’t become just as dependent upon independent spenders as they are now
dependent upon contributors. Limit, but not ban. Congress should be free to set
reasonable limits to avoid improper dependence. It should not be free to silence any one
faction in a debate.
63

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
Cain, supra note 59; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption:
Comments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 163; David A. Strauss, What is the Goal
of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141; see also David A. Strauss, Equality,
Corruption, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1994).
64
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Strauss and Cain, Lowenstein saw this type of exchange as corrupt while Strauss
and Cain saw the problem with such an exchange as one of political inequality.
To make matters more complicated, consider whether it is “corruption”
when a $50,000 campaign contribution (perhaps a contribution to a Super-PAC
supporting a candidate) is used not for personal benefit and not to buy a legislative
vote, but merely to influence the election official’s agenda, insure access to the
elected official to make a considered argument, or create conditions of ingratiation
by building norms of reciprocity between the contributor and the elected official.
Is this a problem of corruption or inequality?65
Some of the liberals on the Supreme Court want to call even this last case
corruption—consider Justice Souter’s admonition in Shrink Missouri that
corruption occurs when elected officials are “too compliant” with the wishes of
big donors.66 However, the conservative Supreme Court majority definitively has
rejected this more expansive definition of corruption in Citizens United.
Not only has the Supreme Court rejected calling the excessive influence of
large contributors over legislative outcomes a kind of corruption; Lessig resists as
well. Lessig denies “dependence corruption” is about corrupt politicians, and he
consistently talks about the “system” being corrupted and not the people in the
system being corrupt. Thus, dependence corruption is “a corruption practiced by
decent people, people we should respect, people working extremely hard to do
what they believe is right, yet decent people working with a system that has
evolved the most elaborate and costly bending of democratic government in our
history.67 “[T]he term dependence corruption describes the process of governance.
It doesn’t point to a particular tainted result.”68 Thus, while there may be room for

65

As Dan Lowenstein explained elsewhere, Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance
Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989), the most sensible
way of thinking of the problem of large contributions buying influence but not outcomes is that it
creates an actuality of a conflict of interest among legislators who are charged with acting in the
public interest.
66
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
67
Lessig, supra note 1, at 8; see also id. at 235 (“Each side subsidizes the work of the other
(lobbyists by securing funds to members: members by securing significant benefits to the clients of
the lobbyists). But that subsidy can happen without anyone intending anything in exchange—
directly. . . . People working within this system can thus believe—and do believe—that they’re
doing nothing wrong by going along with how things work”).
In a more recent work, Lessig seems to recognize that “bad” people may be at play: “And
thus, without even spending a dollar, the super PAC achieves its objective: bending congressmen
to its program. It is a dynamic that would be obvious to Tony Soprano or Michael Corleone but
that is sometimes obscure to political scientists: a protection racket that flourishes while our
Republic burns.” LESSIG, supra note 62, at Kindle Location 628.
68
Lessig, supra note 1, at 17 n.6.
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calling Lessig’s concern one about traditional corruption, both the Supreme Court
and Lessig have resisted.
As least in this instance (although not in the case of the campaign
contribution/legislative vote quid pro quo) I come down on the Strauss/Cain side
of the line and see the concern about large contributions influencing (but not
buying) outcomes as one more about political inequality and less about
(traditional) corruption. The point is debatable, but even calling it “corruption”
would not help much if the audience is the current Supreme Court.
Finally, rather than embrace political equality or even traditional
corruption to support his program, Lessig instead falls back on a trust argument:
“The people” may lose trust in the political process because the people believe
elected officials are too responsive to the interests of the funders rather than the
public interest. This trust and responsiveness concern sounds a lot like a concern
about either the appearance of corruption or an appearance of inequality. It is yet
another argument the Supreme Court rejected in Citizens United69 and it does not
appear to be an argument which can do the kind of heavy jurisprudential lifting
Lessig needs to get past Citizens United’s narrow view of corruption.

IV.
POLITICAL EQUALITY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
AND THE NEXT SUPREME COURT
Suppose I am correct that Lessig’s dependence corruption argument is
really a political equality argument in disguise. Why does it matter?
To begin with, recognizing dependence corruption as a political equality
argument should put to bed the notion that the current Supreme Court can be
persuaded to reverse its Citizens United course and impose some limitations on
independent spending (or contributions funding such spending) in candidate
elections.
Last year, the Montana Supreme Court tried to buck the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United by holding that the state of Montana provided
enough evidence that independent corporate political spending could corrupt the
state’s political process to justify corporate spending limits.70 While the case was
pending before the Supreme Court, Lessig was alone in predicting that the
Supreme Court would take the case and affirm the lower court, with his betting on
69

Lessig’s response on the trust argument is weak. I had pointed to the work of Persily and
Lammie demonstrating that there is no good correlation between campaign finance regulation and
the public’s trust. Lessig concedes the point, Lessig, supra note 2, at 72, “[b]ut that doesn’t mean
that a more trustworthy system wouldn’t increase the public’s trust.” Id.
70
W. Tradition P’ship v. Montana, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).
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Justice Kennedy switching sides from his Citizens United vote.71 The rest of us in
the field predicted what actually happened:72 in American Tradition Partnership
v. Bullock,73 the U.S. Supreme Court smacked down the Montana Supreme Court
in a 5-4 summary reversal in which all the Justices in the Citizens United majority
reaffirmed the soundness of that precedent.
But Lessig was undeterred by the ATP smackdown. As late as January
2013, months after the Montana case, he was predicting that an “originalist”
Justice (but not Justice Scalia, for whom he clerked) could well reverse course on
Citizens United in a future case.74 Lessig believes, following the work of
Professor Zephyr Teachout,75 that “dependence corruption” is a form of
corruption that would have been recognizable and accepted by the Framers as a
legitimate basis to limit spending in elections.76
I leave to others the question whether or not the Lessig/Teachout
interpretation of “corruption” to include concepts of political equality is consistent
with originalist thinking.77 I will note however that in Federalist No. 52, the
71

Corbin Hiar, Lawrence Lessig on Campaign Finance Reform: Overturning ‘Citizens United’
CENTER
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http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/02/29/8278/lawrence-lessig-campaign-finance-reformoverturning-citizens-united-isnt-enough:
After the speech, Lessig, who worked as a clerk for conservative Justice Antonin Scalia
before becoming an academic, added that he was confident that Citizens United will soon
be reversed by the high court.
“I think it’s quite likely Justice Kennedy is about to flip,” he said, referring to the
Supreme Court justice who cast the deciding vote in the controversial 5-to-4 decision.
Although Lessig cautioned that he had no inside information, he said Kennedy “is
completely surprised by how much damage this decision has done – even Scalia doesn’t
like the world where all the money in the world is on one side.”
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See, e.g., Rick Hasen, Montana Citizens United Sequel on Supreme Court Docket for June 14:
What’s Next?, ELECTION LAW BLOG (May 29, 2012), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=34871 (calling
summary reversal a “potentially likely outcome”).
73
132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012).
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Lessig Video, supra note 3.
75
See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
76
Lessig, supra note 2, at 65, 70.
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Teachout has debated Seth Barrett Tillman on these questions of originalism. See Seth Barrett
Tillman, Opening Statement: Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s AntiCorruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and
Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. Colloquy 30 (2012); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public
Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. Colloquy 180 (2013). Lessig weighs in further on the originalist issue in Lessig,
Originalism, supra note 3. Bruce Cain responds to Lessig on originalism, casting serious doubt on
his reading of the Founders’ intent, in Bruce Edward Cain, Is Dependence Corruption the Solution
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phrase “dependent upon the people alone” appears in a passage explaining why
the Constitution set the qualifications for suffrage pertaining to voting for
members of the U.S. House the same as the qualifications for voting for the state
legislature. Publius states that allowing the state legislature the discretion to set
the rules for voting for Congress “would have rendered too dependent on the State
Governments, that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent
on the people alone.”78 The language here has everything to do with federalism
and the federal-state balance, and nothing to do with improper influence by those
with money or other benefits over the Congress. Later in the pamphlet, Publius
explains that biennial elections insures that Congress will be properly dependent
on the people: “Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which
this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.”79 There is no hint in
this Federalist Paper about worries of monied classes influencing the people in
their votes for Congress.
Regardless of the soundness of the originalist debate, the idea that the
current Supreme Court will change course thanks to an undiscovered originalist
argument is a pipe dream. Justice Thomas has been the Justice most hostile to
campaign finance regulation in his time on the Court, leading the way toward
deregulation,80 with Justice Alito closely following suit.81 Justice Kennedy has
never wavered from his dissents in Austin, in which he said that the Michigan law
limiting corporate spending in elections to PACs “is the rawest form of
censorship,”82 and in McConnell, in which he first declared that ingratiation and
access are not corruption83—a point he made into a majority opinion in Citizens
United.84 And Chief Justice Roberts has yet to vote to uphold a campaign finance
limit while on the Court; his opinions have lamented FEC regulation as speech
suppression, declaring “enough is enough.”85

to America’s Campaign Finance Problems?, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), draft available,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2267187.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1991).
79
Id.
80
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Justice Alito has voting to strike down or limit every campaign finance law to come before him
on the Supreme Court, and has expressed serious misgivings about the constitutionality of
campaign finance disclosure. Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2822-2827 (Alito, J., concurring).
82
Austin, 494 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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McConnell v. FEC, 540 US. 93, 294-95 (2003).
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This Supreme Court majority won’t budge on this question despite original
understandings of the meaning of “corruption,” and arguing that it will gives
supporters false hope.
So where does change come from? Agitating for a constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United may be good politics for those on the
left—who have made the case a symbol of Republican overreaching—but in a
highly polarized Congress and country, there is virtually no chance barring a
major national scandal that a super-majority of Congress and the states will
support a constitutional amendment allowing spending limits in candidate
elections.
Instead, the best way to change the First Amendment is to change the
Supreme Court. Within a decade, it is quite likely that due to age Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, or both will leave the Court. The current Supreme Court’s
ideological divide is also party-based: thanks to polarization generally, all the
conservatives on the Court were appointed by Republican presidents and all the
liberals on the Court were appointed by Democratic presidents.86 The two newest
members of the Court, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, joined with Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg to dissent in the Montana case arguing for Citizens United to be
reconsidered.87 These four Democrat-appointed Justices also joined in a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kagan in the Bennett campaign finance
case.88 A Democratic president in the next 10 years could well appoint the
deciding fifth Justice who could reverse Citizens United.
But even if a Democratic president gets to appoint another Justice Kagan
or Sotomayor to the Court, it is not clear that the Court will overturn Citizens
United. Laws limiting money in elections can keep incumbents in office, and
squelch political debate, points Justice Kagan recognized when she rejected
Austin in writings as a law professor.89 The greatest danger of Super-PACs—that
they skew legislative outcomes and priorities on non-salient public policy
questions—is well hidden from public view, and regulation could be a hard sell to
a skeptical court given its First Amendment costs.
Supporters of reasonable campaign finance regulation need to spend the
time now crafting strong arguments which could sustain close judicial scrutiny.
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Should all political equality arguments be on the table? Or are arguments for
equality of inputs more justifiable than equality of outputs or equality of
opportunity? How should the courts balance this interest in equality with concerns
of squelched speech and incumbency protection? When does the attempt to insure
that representatives are responsive to “the people” cross the line into
impermissible censorship?
At first cut, input-equalizing campaign finance measures may present
fewer First Amendment dangers than output measures. In these models, such as
those using vouchers, political power resides with voters, not with candidates, and
plans which equalize political power among voters is more likely to insure that
campaign funding reflects voter preferences and insures a wide variety of voices,
ideologies and opinions in campaigns and in legislative battles. Equal funding for
candidates in an output-equalizing plan (depending on the permissibility of
outside group spending) could more seriously limit the robustness of political
debate, creating greater dangers of incumbency protection and the squelching of
political speech. Opportunity-equalizing measures may present the lowest First
Amendment dangers, through the use of floors without ceilings, but also may
provide the fewest benefits in assuring political equality.
I hope that Lessig turns his considerable talents to addressing these thorny
questions of political equality. It is no longer enough to point to the gap between
the public interest and the interests of those who contribute, spend, and fundraise
to gain disproportionate political influence. It is time for clear heads to build a
new political equality architecture to support fair campaign finance laws ready to
be assembled when the time comes.

